

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: COMMENTS ON UK PAPER

REF: A. STATE 144904 B. MBFR VIENNA 294

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1. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE UK PAPER ON OPTION III --
CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS (REF A) ARE BEING PASSED TO UK
EMBASSY HERE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: WE APPRECIATE FURTHER UK VIEWS ON THE MBFR OPTION III PROPOSAL. WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE THE UK CONCLUSION THAT OUR APPROACH TO CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS OUTLINED IN THE US "NEXT STEPS" PAPER OF 11 JUNE PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE, AND WE ARE PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THE FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS REFLECTED IN THE USEFUL UK PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR BASIC VIEWS ARE CLOSELY ALIGNED ON MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES.

3. OUR OVERALL VIEW IS THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD AIM AT A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT, BUT ONE WHICH RETAINS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR FUTURE DEFENSE INTEGRATION. SUBJECT TO THIS PRINCIPLE, WE WOULD NOT WISH OUR BASIC OPTION III PROPOSAL TO BE OVERSHADOWED OR SIDE-TRACKED BY

CEILINGS ISSUES EITHER IN ALLIANCE CONSULTATION OR IN NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. RATHER WE SHOULD KEEP THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR PROPOSAL IN THE FOREFRONT AND NOT UNNECESSARILY SETTLE DETAILED ISSUES BEFORE WE DISCOVER WHETHER THE BASIC PROPOSAL IS ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST.

4. OUR GOAL IN PUTTING FORWARD OPTION III IS TO ACHIEVE ALLIANCE PHASE I OBJECTIVES, THAT IS, THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND EASTERN COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD THUS BE CONCEIVED AS A MAKEWEIGHT FOR ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND REDUCING MANPOWER AS WELL AS TANK DISPARITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE LATTER CONNECTION, AN OFFER OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO OFFSETTING REDUCTIONS OF ELEMENTS (INCLUDING SELECTED ARMAMENTS) WHICH EACH SIDE PERCEIVES TO BE PARTICULARLY THREATENING. WE WOULD CONSIDER AS THREATENING THE FOLLOWING EASTERN ELEMENTS: FIRST, THE PREPONDERANCE OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE CENTRAL REGION; SECONDLY, THE OFFENSIVE STRUCTURE OF THE PACT FORCES IN THE FORM OF HEAVY ARMOR FORMATIONS AND OF A TANK DISPARITY WHICH FAVORS THE
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EAST. THUS WE SEEK TO REDRESS THE OVERALL MANPOWER BALANCE BY SEEKING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO APPLICATION OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THIS GOAL AND ALSO TO LESSEN THE EXISTING TANK DISPARITY, WE SEEK TO GAIN THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. OUR POSITIONS APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT IN THIS REGARD.

5. WE BELIEVE, AS THE UK PAPER ALSO EMPHASIZES, THAT SOME TYPE OF CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS MUST BE IMPOSED IN THE EVENT WE DEPLOY OPTION III TO PREVENT SOVIET INCREASES OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE RESULTING FROM THE REDUCTIONS. WE BELIEVE OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES ARE CONSISTENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THIS POINT.

6. WE FIND THE UK IDEA ON THE FORM OF PRESENTATION OF CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TANKS HELPFUL. WE AGREE THAT THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEPTUALLY LINKING TOO CLOSELY THE LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND TANKS. WE WOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TOTAL TRADE, AND NOT TO OVERLY STRESS IN OUR PRESENTATION TO THE EAST ANY PARTICULAR CEILINGS LINKAGES OR FORMAL CATEGORIZATIONS. WE WOULD RATHER SOLVE INDIVIDUAL CEILING NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS ONE STEP AT A TIME, AS WE PURSUE A GENERAL LINE OF MARCH TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVES.

7. NEVERTHELESS, WE WANT TO GUARD AGAINST EASTERN EFFORTS TO IMPOSE CONSTRAINTS ON ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS EVEN IF

THEIR WITHDRAWAL HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY AGREED. WE WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR IN OUR PRESENTATIONS THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS OF THE TYPES SPECIFICALLY REDUCED BY THE AGREEMENT (NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND TANKS) CAN BE LIMITED. THE SPECIFIC LIMITS ON US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND SOVIET TANKS CAN CERTAINLY BE PRESENTED AND DISCUSSED SEPARATELY; BUT THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR NOT LIMITING OTHER TYPES OF ARMAMENTS MUST ALSO BE ESTABLISHED. IT IS THIS REQUIREMENT, AND NOT PRESENTATIONAL STRATEGY, THAT CREATES A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND ON TANKS.

8. CONCERNING SOME SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN THE UK PAPER,
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WE WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. WE VIEW LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF LEAVING ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TOTALLY UNCONSTRAINED, AND THE NEED TO AVOID LIMITS ON ALLIANCE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN ROUGHLY THE SAME WAY AS DOES THE UK.

-- WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR SOME LIMIT ON SUCH SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE IMPACT OF DEMANDING TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON OPTION III'S NEGOTIATING VALUE. AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH TIGHT RESTRICTIONS WOULD LIKELY PROVOKE CORRESPONDING SOVIET DEMANDS FOR ANALOGOUS LIMITS ON US TANKS REGARDLESS OF HOW WELL WESTERN PRESENTATIONS SEPARATE TANKS FROM NUCLEAR ISSUES.

-- WHILE WE HAVE STUDIED THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AIR BALANCE OF NATO PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE, WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE THE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS SCHEDULED FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE DURING THE COMING YEARS, AND BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL SUBJECT FOR MILITARY TECHNICAL STUDY IN NATO IN CONNECTION WITH

OPTION III.

-- WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING THE LANCE OR OTHER
SIMILAR SSMS TO BE THE SUBJECT OF LIMITATION.

B. THE ALTERNATIVE UK APPROACHES FOR POSSIBLE CEILINGS ON
US TANKS ARE RATHER MORE SPECIFIC THAN WHAT WE HAVE IN
MIND. THE BRITISH IDEA OF AN "UNEQUAL CEILING" -- WHICH WE
CHARACTERIZE AS AN UNEQUAL RESTRAINT -- IS NOT UNLIKE THE
APPROACH OF THE "US VIEWS" PAPER. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN
MIND THAT USE OF A "COMMON CEILING" APPROACH TO TANK
CEILINGS MIGHT LEAD TO A SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL FOR A
COMMON CEILING ON NUCLEAR ELEMENTS.

C. WITH RESPECT TO LIMITS ON NSWP TANKS, WE BELIEVE IT
MORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID LIMITS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS
THAN IT IS TO SEEK LIMITS ON NSWP TANKS, WHICH ARE NOT THE
THREAT SOVIET TANKS ARE.

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9. TWO FINAL POINTS RAISED IN THE UK PAPER SHOULD BE
CLARIFIED.

A. ALTHOUGH WE WISH AT THIS STAGE TO AVOID A COMMITMENT
TO ANY SPECIFIC FOLLOW-ON MECHANISM FOR TREATING FUTURE
AIRCRAFT ADDITIONS IN THE AREA, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER
FURTHER HOW WE MIGHT DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM AT A POINT WHEN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WARRANT IT.

B. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOW PREPARED ONLY TO SUGGEST THAT THE
SOVIETS NOT INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN SUCH A
MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT, WE HAVE
SAID THAT THIS APPROACH INVITES A DIALOGUE OVER THE SPECIFIC
UNDERSTANDING WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED. WE WOULD
WANT TO DEFER ENGAGING IN SUCH A DIALOGUE UNTIL AFTER WE
HAVE RECEIVED AND ASSESSED A CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION TO
OPTION III.

-- WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME LIMIT CAN BE PUT ON
THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET WARHEADS AND CERTAIN SSMS INTO
THE NGA, IN ADDITION TO AIRCRAFT.

-- ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR A FURTHER SOVIET
QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN AIR CAPABILITY IN THE AREA, WE
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE UK
PROJECTIONS OF 350 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SOVIET AIRCRAFT YET TO
COME. INGERSOLL

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